fix: final-review wave (CSRF guard, fail-closed owner bootstrap, streamed zips, e2e visibility suite)

- Critical 1 (CSRF): core wrap refuses every POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE whose Origin
  (Referer as fallback) is not publicUrl's origin or STC_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, and
  any body that is not application/json (multipart only on declared upload
  routes). Better Auth routes go through the same guard; only declared
  identity-provider callbacks (SAML ACS/SLO, OAuth callbacks) are exempt.
  Better Auth trustedOrigins use the same list. Session cookie stays Lax
  (Strict breaks OAuth/OIDC/SAML returns); documented.
- Important 4 / learner minor 4: the first-owner claim and the role row are
  one transaction guarded by "no owner yet"; only a unique violation means
  learner; any other error fails the sign-up with 500 and removes the
  half-created user. Serialised per DB handle (Bun's SQLite connection).
- Important 2 / learner minor 12: code zips stream entry by entry (large
  files stored in 256 KB chunks with a data descriptor and incremental
  CRC-32), so memory stays at one chunk; the cap is now 1 GiB (ZIP32).
- Important 3 / learner minor 10: the e2e runs the production wiring
  (productFeatures order, AI drafts through the real sink) against a
  restricted course and asserts 404/401 for learner and anonymous on
  course, lesson, media, cover, code, zip, notes, progress, attempts, AI
  chat, library, search and AI status; a real Range request (206, 416);
  forged writes (foreign Origin, text/plain, no Origin) are 403 and the MCP
  test command never runs.
- Minors 7-9: compose passes every documented variable; the health check
  uses STC_PORT; productFeatures checks the studio-before-AI order.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Lucas Winther
2026-10-30 15:42:17 +01:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 69aaedcb43
commit 8045c80d93
24 changed files with 725 additions and 85 deletions
+12
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,13 @@ export interface Feature {
jobs?: Record<string, JobHandler>; // job kind -> handler
auth?: AuthService; // replaces the anonymous AuthService (the learner package supplies it)
stop?(): void | Promise<void>; // called when the server stops (timers, watchers)
/** Route keys (as in `routes`) whose writes take multipart/form-data instead of JSON (uploads). */
multipartRoutes?: string[];
/**
* Path prefixes an outside identity provider posts to (SAML ACS/SLO, OAuth callbacks). Core's cross-site request
* guard skips them; the handler must verify the request itself (signed assertion, OAuth state).
*/
externalCallbacks?: string[];
}
/** Features are built after the ServerContext exists. The job queue is built from the union of their `jobs`, so a
* factory must not use `ctx.jobs` synchronously (only while a request or job runs). */
@@ -48,4 +55,9 @@ export interface AppConfig {
transcribeUrl: string | null;
/** STC_PYTHON, default python3: Python with PyMuPDF, used for PDF page images and text. */
python: string;
/**
* Origins allowed to send state-changing requests: the origin of `publicUrl` plus STC_ALLOWED_ORIGINS
* (comma-separated; STC_TRUSTED_ORIGINS is read as an alias). Core refuses writes from any other origin.
*/
allowedOrigins: string[];
}