fix(learner): review round 1: sanitize-html, sandboxed runner frame, one visibility rule, no Tab capture
C1: lesson HTML goes through a sanitize-html allowlist on the fully rendered output (no on* attributes, no style, no svg/math/iframe/object/embed/form; URLs limited to http(s), mailto, relative and anchors). Raw tags outside the allowlist are escaped as text. The SPA document is served with a CSP (script-src 'self', no inline script) through spaWithCsp in main.ts; contract request §5 asks core to own it. C2: exercises run in <iframe sandbox="allow-scripts"> (opaque origin, no cookies) loaded from /api/learner/runner-frame, whose CSP allows only its own script (by hash) and blob: workers, and connect-src 'none'. postMessage only, both sides check event.source; the timeout removes the frame. The worker stubs now also cover Worker, SharedWorker and caches. I1: learner visibility calls core canView with per-course authorship only, like /api/media (contract request §6). I2: Tab and Shift+Tab move focus; Enter keeps the previous line's indentation. Tests: XSS unit cases, headless-Chrome checks for the exploit lesson and for fetch, import, Cache.add, nested Worker, img, EventSource, WebSocket, XHR and sendBeacon from learner and test code (plus a negative control), visibility on both dialects, SPA and runner-frame CSP headers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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Claude Opus 5.5
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061ae7a2d9
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@@ -100,11 +100,12 @@ test("systemic-design hint numbering forms one group", () => {
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});
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test("raw HTML is reduced to safe tags", () => {
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expect(sanitizeHtml('<script>alert(1)</script><kbd>x</kbd><img src=x onerror=alert(1)><details open>')).toBe("<script>alert(1)</script><kbd>x</kbd><img src=x onerror=alert(1)><details open>");
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expect(sanitizeHtml('<script>alert(1)</script><kbd>x</kbd><img src=x onerror=alert(1)><details open>')).toBe('<script>alert(1)</script><kbd>x</kbd><img src="x" /><details open></details>');
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const html = renderLessonHtml('<div onclick="x()">hi</div>\n\n[x](javascript:alert(1)) <span style="color:red">s</span>', opts);
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expect(html).not.toContain("<div");
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expect(html).toContain("<div>hi</div>");
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expect(html).not.toContain("onclick");
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expect(html).not.toContain("javascript:");
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expect(html).not.toContain('<span style');
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expect(html).not.toContain("style=");
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});
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test("links and images resolve inside the course", () => {
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@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ test("links and images resolve inside the course", () => {
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expect(resolveHref("https://example.com", opts, "link")).toEqual({ url: "https://example.com", external: true });
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expect(resolveHref("img/a.png", opts, "image")).toEqual({ url: "/api/media/pure-snake/course/img/a.png", external: false });
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const html = renderLessonHtml(" and [ext](https://x.org)", opts);
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expect(html).toContain('<img src="/api/media/pure-snake/course/img/board.png" alt="board" loading="lazy">');
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expect(html).toContain('<img src="/api/media/pure-snake/course/img/board.png" alt="board" loading="lazy" />');
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expect(html).toContain('target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"');
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});
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