- Media exclusions move from the editable root .gitignore to the repo's
info/exclude, and dirtyFiles never counts files listed in media.json, so an
author's or remote's .gitignore cannot block publish or Sync. Publish and
Sync refuse commits that track a file over referenced media.
- Importer jobs (code-repo, pdf-deck, transcribe) and the cover route run
under the course lock now shared with the studio (core withCourseLock) and
re-check the course inside it; after conversion they fail with "this course
is now edited in the studio". Convert answers 409 while an import job for
the course is queued or running, and the job re-checks.
- Crash-safe conversion: the import folder is hidden (.converting-<id>) before
the published worktree exists; cross-filesystem moves copy into a staging
dir, fsync, verify size and sha256, then rename; the source is retired as
.converted-<id>.<n>. Recovery runs at server start and before every convert;
a re-run of a finished conversion reports success. The loader skips
dot-folders.
- Minor: no raw NUL bytes in source, link fallback only on EXDEV/EPERM/EMLINK,
referenced media are not read whole by the editor, missing media are logged,
mediaDir JSDoc, docs on per-author copies across filesystems.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
- Critical 1 (CSRF): core wrap refuses every POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE whose Origin
(Referer as fallback) is not publicUrl's origin or STC_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, and
any body that is not application/json (multipart only on declared upload
routes). Better Auth routes go through the same guard; only declared
identity-provider callbacks (SAML ACS/SLO, OAuth callbacks) are exempt.
Better Auth trustedOrigins use the same list. Session cookie stays Lax
(Strict breaks OAuth/OIDC/SAML returns); documented.
- Important 4 / learner minor 4: the first-owner claim and the role row are
one transaction guarded by "no owner yet"; only a unique violation means
learner; any other error fails the sign-up with 500 and removes the
half-created user. Serialised per DB handle (Bun's SQLite connection).
- Important 2 / learner minor 12: code zips stream entry by entry (large
files stored in 256 KB chunks with a data descriptor and incremental
CRC-32), so memory stays at one chunk; the cap is now 1 GiB (ZIP32).
- Important 3 / learner minor 10: the e2e runs the production wiring
(productFeatures order, AI drafts through the real sink) against a
restricted course and asserts 404/401 for learner and anonymous on
course, lesson, media, cover, code, zip, notes, progress, attempts, AI
chat, library, search and AI status; a real Range request (206, 416);
forged writes (foreign Origin, text/plain, no Origin) are 403 and the MCP
test command never runs.
- Minors 7-9: compose passes every documented variable; the health check
uses STC_PORT; productFeatures checks the studio-before-AI order.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Dockerfile on oven/bun:1.3 with ffmpeg, git, unzip and python3-pymupdf, a
production install, non-root user, /data volume and a health check;
docker-compose.yml (project stc) with an optional postgres:17 profile and
read-only course and import mounts; docs/operations.md with configuration,
mounts, security headers and the measured idle memory (101.4 MiB for app plus
Postgres after 5 minutes idle).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
The proxy, its internal server, Unix socket and NO_PROXY changes are gone; main.ts serves the HTML
import directly again. apps/web/index.html carries the SPA policy as <meta http-equiv=CSP> ahead of every
script (script-src 'self' plus the hash of Bun's dev-server helper, no unsafe-inline/eval; no
frame-ancestors, which meta cannot carry). Dev HMR connects under it. The runner frame keeps its header CSP.
Tests: the served index.html (prod and dev, in a subprocess) has the meta policy and every inline script
is hash-covered; the XSS browser test fails with the sanitizer disabled and passes with it, and the meta
CSP alone blocks unsanitized handlers (with a no-CSP control); no source assigns proxy env vars, and the
feature leaves them untouched at runtime. Contract request 5 asks core for frame-ancestors/X-Frame-Options.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
C1: lesson HTML goes through a sanitize-html allowlist on the fully rendered output (no on* attributes, no
style, no svg/math/iframe/object/embed/form; URLs limited to http(s), mailto, relative and anchors). Raw tags
outside the allowlist are escaped as text. The SPA document is served with a CSP (script-src 'self', no inline
script) through spaWithCsp in main.ts; contract request §5 asks core to own it.
C2: exercises run in <iframe sandbox="allow-scripts"> (opaque origin, no cookies) loaded from
/api/learner/runner-frame, whose CSP allows only its own script (by hash) and blob: workers, and connect-src
'none'. postMessage only, both sides check event.source; the timeout removes the frame. The worker stubs now
also cover Worker, SharedWorker and caches.
I1: learner visibility calls core canView with per-course authorship only, like /api/media (contract request §6).
I2: Tab and Shift+Tab move focus; Enter keeps the previous line's indentation.
Tests: XSS unit cases, headless-Chrome checks for the exploit lesson and for fetch, import, Cache.add, nested
Worker, img, EventSource, WebSocket, XHR and sendBeacon from learner and test code (plus a negative control),
visibility on both dialects, SPA and runner-frame CSP headers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
- Learner links go through lessonUrl/courseUrl (src/web/urls.ts).
- Generation, the studio course list and file listing require an authoring
right and core canView, so a global author needs a grant for a restricted
course. Contract requests 8 (global author in canView) and 9
(STC_AI_ALLOWED_BASE_URLS in AppConfig).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
C1: writes lstat every path component and refuse symlinks (dangling included),
check the parent's real path after mkdir, and open with O_NOFOLLOW.
I1: only https://, ssh:// and git@host: remotes; protocol.file/ext/fd=never on
every fetch and push; global/system git config ignored.
I2: STC_UPLOAD_MAX_MB cap (default 100) by Content-Length and while streaming;
extension allowlist (415); stcourse.yaml refused; 409 unless overwrite=true;
sandboxing CSP on draft raw files.
I3: owner-only visibility/source.kind rule checked on the merged result at
publish and sync, and at resolve; publish also validates the merged tree.
I4: bare repos in <dataDir>/studio/repos/<id>.git; imported courses read-only.
I5: list status comes from the bare repo; drafts are created lazily.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
